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The Behavior of Money and Other Economic Variables: Two Natural Experiments
JEL: E5 and F3
Keywords: Money Behavior, Inflation
Every once in a great while, history provides us with a natural experiment, an episode in which a
major change in a key economic variable occurs that has no direct relation to the contemporaneous
behavior of the variables that theory suggests it ought to effect.1
A classic example was the currency reform during the U.S. Civil War by the Confederacy in
spring 1864. A second was provided by the massive inflow of specie from the New World to Spain in
the sixteenth century. In the first of these examples, a rapidly growing money stock suddenly fell and a
decline in the price level followed. In the second, a century-long upward movement in price levels
occurred throughout most of Europe. The question that researchers addressed in both instances had to do
with the links between the monetary changes and the price behavior that followed (Lerner, 1956;
Hamilton, 1934).
In this paper, we investigate a similar set of questions using data from two much more recent
episodes, both involving changes in the inflation and monetary-policy regimes: the move to floating
exchange rates following the breakdown of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s, and the shifts toward less
expansive monetary policy that to varying degrees occurred throughout the industrialized world a decade
later. In the case of the float, inflation which had been rising since the mid-1960s, surged throughout the
industrial world, in some countries like the United Kingdom reaching peaks well into the double digits.
Following the shifts to less expansive domestic policy, inflation peaked in most of those same countries
and has continued to decline more or less unabated until the current day. John Taylor (2002) in reviewing
the monetary history of this era, described it as “the Great Inflation flanked by two periods of relative price
stability.”
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See Bernanke (2002) for a discussion of important empirical role that such experiments have played in
monetary economics.
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The most straightforward, but not at all uncontroversial, explanation of these drastic changes in
inflation behavior is in terms of the quantity theory of money. In the simplest quantity theory model, these
differences correspond in one-to-one fashion with differences in monetary behavior. According to this
explanation, inflation rose on average as monetary policy became more expansive in the United States, the
reserve-currency country under the Bretton Woods system and the effects that more expansive policy
spilled abroad. Cross-country differences then began to emerge as a result of increased differences among
countries in domestic policy goals. The breakdown of Bretton Woods and move to floating exchange rates
resulted from, and subsequently accommodated, this difference in policy goals.2 Correspondingly,
inflation rates both fell and converged internationally in 1984-98 as monetary policies in the various
countries became less expansive on average and more closely in sync with one another during the course
of this period.
This explanation, however, has been subject to dispute on several scores. From the very outset,
many economists have questioned the assertion that the increased rate of inflation post-1973 was primarily
the result of shifts in monetary policy goals. The then-reigning and still popular alternative explanation
attributed the inflation increase to the first oil-price shock.3 The continued high inflation for a decade
thereafter, proponents of this view argued further, was due primarily to the second oil-price shock in 1979,
and the lower inflation that followed to the absences of such shocks.
A second area of dispute is the behavior of the demand for money following the waves of financial
innovations that began around the start of 1980s.4 Indeed, this behavior has seemed so problematic, that a
number of papers have appeared in Federal Reserve publications and other research-oriented publications
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See Bordo (1993), Darby, Lothian, et al. (1983), and Meltzer (1991) for discussions of the Bretton Woods

period.
3

Blinder (1982) was an influential proponent of this explanation. Darby (1982) and Gandolfi and Lothian
(1983), however, present largely contrary evidence.
4

Empirical investigations concerned with this issue include Friedman and Kuttner (1992), Estrella and
Mishkin (1997) and Carlson, et al. (2000).
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with titles ranging from “Is there a Role for Monetary Aggregates in the Conduct of Monetary Policy?”
(Estrella and Mishkin, 1997), to "Are Money Growth and Inflation Still Related?" (Dwyer and Hafer,
1999), to “What Remains of Monetarism?” (Hafer, 2001). While the authors of the latter two studies
present evidence that is largely favorable to the quantity theory model, Estrella and Mishkin, and others
such as Friedman and Kuttner (1992, 1996), have been less sanguine. Perhaps more telling in this regard
are the actual practices of monetary policy makers. Most industrial country central banks focus
exclusively on one or the other short-term interest rate in conducting policy, with little seeming attention to
the various monetary aggregates (Borio, 1997). Indeed, the well known “Taylor rule” for the conduct of
monetary policy is couched in terms of a short-term interest rate (in the U.S. case, the federal funds rate)
rather than money supply or some narrower monetary aggregate such as bank reserves or high-powered
money.
A corresponding series of objections has been raised with regard to the monetary model of
exchange rates implicit in the quantity theoretic explanation of inflation behavior. In what has become a
classic article on the subject, Meese and Rogoff (1983) demonstrated the poor predictive power of the
model relative to a naive random-walk forecast. Flood and Rose (1995) reached similar conclusions using
quite different methods. They compared the volatilities of nominal exchange rates and the variables that
appear as arguments in standard exchange-rate equations -- the "fundamentals." Nominal exchange rate
volatility was of course greater under a float than under fixed rates but the volatility of the fundamentals
was roughly the same in their data set. Their conclusion was that “the most critical determinants of
exchange-rate volatility are not macroeconomic." A related body of literature has raised questions with
regard to the insulating properties of floating exchange rates. See, for example, Lastrapes and Koray
(1990), Joyce and Kamas (1995) and Wheeler and Pozo (1995).
In the empirical analysis that follows, we investigate the relations between money and prices, real
incomes and exchange rates using panel data for 20 OECD countries over the period 1957 to 1998. In so
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doing, we focus is on the cross-country and cross-regime dimension of these data.5 We use data in the
form of growth shifts, cross-regime changes in the within-regime average rates of growth of the variables .
We adopt this method of data analysis for several reasons. One, which we already have discussed,
is the quasi-controlled experiments to which these changes in the monetary regime give rise. In principle,
they should be very nearly exogenous to contemporaneous changes in inflation and the other economic
variables of interest. A second is that averaging the data is one way to proxy the long-term equilibria of
theory. The recent literature on tests of the neutrality proposition central to such theory stresses the
importance of this factor (see, for example, Fisher and Seater, 1993). A third reason has to do with the
magnitude of these cross-regime shifts. The differences in average inflation rates across the three regimes
account for close to 90 per cent of the movement in that series over this forty-year period.6 They,
therefore, have been and still are of considerable interest in and of themselves, not just to researchers but
also to policy makers and the general public. Finally, focusing on such movements takes us at least part
way in solving the signal extraction problem that so often seems to plague empirical investigations of
economic data.
Estrella and Mishkin (1997) and Friedman and Schwartz (1991) contain discussions of this
problem in the specific context of monetary economics. Estrella and Mishkin point out that one possible
reason for their largely negative results may simply be a low signal-to-noise ratio in their data, since their
sample is dominated by a period of low variability in the growth rates of both money and the other
nominal variables of interest. In such an environment, shocks to velocity, the “noise”in the system, can
more easily obscure the monetary effects, the “signals,” and thus mask the true relationships between
money supply and nominal income and the price level. Friedman and Schwartz (1991, pp.43-45) discuss
this problem in the more general context of the errors-in-variables (e.i.v.) model. They suggest that such
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Earlier studies employing a methodology similar to ours include Duck (1993), Dwyer and Hafer (1999),
Lothian (1985), McCandless and Webber (1995), and Schwartz (1973).
6

See the regression results presented below in Table 1a.
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errors be “interpreted to include all stochastic disturbances affecting the variables under study.” They go
on to say that in economic investigations, these errors generally have two dimensions, stemming both from
the use of imprecise empirical proxies for the variables suggested by theory and from actual errors of
measurement in the proxies themselves.
Our use of averages of the underlying data is a traditional method of dealing with errors-invariables (e.i.v.) problems of the sort enumerated by Friedman and Schwartz. The techniques we use help
correct for various aspects of this problem. The broader temporal movements upon which we focus are
likely to have a higher signal-to-noise ratio than the monthly or quarterly data used in most studies and
thus be less subject to the difficulties that Estrella and Mishkin describe. As Coakley, Flood and Taylor
(2002) point out taking account of the cross-country variation is likely to help further.
The results we obtain using these procedures, for the most part, are highly positive. The moneyprice relationship that we observe is fully consistent with theory – growth shifts in the nominal stock of
money and in the price level are highly correlated and bear a one-to-one relation to one another. Growth
shifts in exchange rates are significantly related both to growth shifts in relative price levels and to growth
shifts in relative excess supplies of money. The classical neutrality proposition receives positive, though
not totally unambiguous, support.
Though considerably better than one would expect on the basis of much of the current literature,
these results are not without recent precedent. Studies of the links between money growth and inflation
and money growth and nominal income that use longer-period averages of the data, such as Dewald (1998,
2003), Dwyer and Hafer (1999), and McCandless and Weber (1995) and of money demand that use
cointegration techniques such as Carlson et al. (2000) all report positive findings. The same is true for
studies of exchange rate behavior that use either long historical data sets (e.g., Lothian and Taylor 1996;
Alan Taylor, 2002), or long-period averages of (differenced) multi-country panel data (Flood and Taylor,
1996; Lothian, 1997). Perhaps tellingly from the standpoint of the e.i.v. problem, in all of these instances
the focus is on long-run behavior and in most of the data sets are characterized by substantial variation in
5

the series in question

I. Industrial Country Inflation in the Post-World War II Period
In the early post war years, the Bretton Woods Agreement for fixed exchange rates exerted a
powerful force on inflation behavior in the countries making up that system. Under the Bretton Woods
regime, cross-country inflation differences were non-zero but generally quite small. In the absence of
revaluation or devaluation, inflation rates and monetary policies could not wander too far from inflation and
monetary policy in the United States, the reserve-currency country. The agreement started to break down
when in August 1971, the United States unilaterally floated. The European countries, after futile attempts
to maintain some exchange-rate fixity, gave up the ghost a little over a year and a half later and a new era
in the behavior of monetary policy and inflation both within and across countries began.
Figures 1 and 2 describe post-World War II inflation experience. Figure 1 presents a time-series
plot of the average inflation rate across the 20 countries in our data set and Figure 2 presents a comparable
plot of the cross-country standard deviation of those inflation rates.7 A visual inspection of the data shows
that the Bretton Woods’ era was characterized both by moderate rates of inflation and by moderate crosscountry variability. Inflation behavior, however, changed in both respects after 1973. In the early years of
the floating exchange rate regime the cross- country average inflation rates were considerably above the
average rates during the fixed exchange rate regime and much more disparate across countries. However,
high and volatile inflation rates do not continue. Somewhere in the mid-1980s the pattern of inflation
changed again, this time characterized by low inflation rates and moderate to low cross-country
variability.
I.A. Estimation of a Second Structural Break

7

Data in Figure 1 are the annual averages of inflation for the following OECD countries: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. The data in Figure 2 are the crosscountry standard deviations of these annual averages. The source of these data was the IFS on CD-Rom.
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To attach some precision to the dating of these changes in inflation behavior, we ran
autoregressions of the form:

Xt = b1 + b2 D2 + b3 D3 + b 4 X t-1 + ,t,

where X is either the average cross-country inflation rate or the standard deviation of the cross- country
inflation rate, D2 and D3 are zero-one dummy variables, b1 through b4 are coefficients to be estimated and
,t is an error term. We ran these regressions over the period 1957 to 1998. using both the annual average

CPI inflation rates for the 20 OECD countries plotted in Figure 1 and the individual country inflation rates
themselves. For comparison purposes, we ran a similar regression for the cross-country standard
deviations plotted in Figure 2.
We assume that the breakdown of Bretton Woods agreement in 1973 can be used as the end-date
of the first (low-inflation) regime. We therefore created a dummy variable, D2, that took the value of one
for the years 1974 to1998 and zero otherwise and let the data inform our choice of the date of the second
break. To do so this we created a second dummy, D3, that took the value one for the years 1977 to 1998
and zero otherwise and then went on to create 21 additional versions of this variable, in each instance
letting the starting date for the third period begin one year later. We then run the regression for each
version of the D3 variable and chose as the second breakpoint the date that minimized the standard error of
the regression. The breaks that we identified on the basis of this procedure were 1982-83 for the crosscountry average inflation rate and 1988-89 for the cross-country standard deviation of the inflation rates.
The estimates for these dates and corresponding Chow tests are presented in Tables 1a and 1b.
We used the same procedure for the individual countries’ inflation rates. The resulting dates for
the beginning of the third period of inflation behavior on a country-by-country basis are presented in Table
2. As the table indicates, these dates differ somewhat among countries, the shifts in the inflation regimes
in Japan and the Netherlands coming much earlier than in the other countries and the shift in Australia,
7

Sweden and possibly Switzerland, coming much later, though the Swiss finding may be spurious given the
low and relatively stable rates of Swiss inflation over most of our sample period. The means and medians
of these individual-country figures show breaks occurring a year later than for the average inflation rate –
1983-84 versus 1982-83. In the empirical work reported below we used the later of these two breakpoints
in computing growth shifts. None of the results we report depend crucially on that choice, however. In
additional work not reported here, we obtained virtually identical results using the alternative 1982-83
breakpoint.

II. Money and Inflation: Theoretical Considerations
The changes in the inflation regime that we have just described provide us with the two natural
experiments to which we alluded at the outset of this paper and which we go on to use in testing alternative
explanations of inflation and of macroeconomic behavior more generally.
To formalize the argument and illustrate the potential differences in economic behavior under
regimes of fixed and floating exchange rates, let us consider a long-run, two-country quantity theoretic
model. A model of this sort underlies the analysis Friedman and Schwartz's (1963) Monetary History as
their subsequent discussion (1991) makes clear. It is the basis of the monetary approach to the balance of
payments advanced by Harry G. Johnson and others at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s (e.g., Johnson,
1969). Along with its closed-economy analogue it also underlies much other theorizing on the subject of
inflation (e.g., Schwartz, 1973).
This two-country world is made up of a small open domestic economy and large reserve-currency
country. In the case of the domestic economy, the model takes the form of a demand for money function,
a monetary equilibrium condition, and a modified purchasing power parity relation.
We write the demand for money function as:

(1)

dmd = L (dy,di,u) + dp ,
8

where dmd is the percentage rate of growth of the desired quantity of nominal cash balances demanded, dy
is the percentage rate of growth of real income, di is the change in the nominal rate of interest, dp is the
rate of inflation and u is a portmanteau variable included to represent other factors such as the degree of
financial sophistication and the quality of money. Real income in the long-run context of the model is
assumed to be exogenous, determined outside the model in the Walrasian system of equations that describe
the myriad individual markets making up the economy. It is, moreover, assumed to be unaffected by
changes in monetary growth. Money is “neutral.”
The purchasing power parity relation is also written in terms of rates of change and takes the
form:

(2)

dp = dp' + de - dq,

where a prime signifies the reserve-currency country, de is the percentage change in the nominal exchange
rate, defined as the price in domestic currency of a unit of the reserve currency, and dq is the percentage
change in the (equilibrium) real exchange rate. Inclusion of the last term, therefore, allows for the effects
of real variables, such as continued differences in productivity growth in the two countries, on the
exchange rate. In the fixed exchange rate case, de is zero and if dq is also zero, as it is assumed to be in
the strict version of the purchasing power parity hypothesis, dp will equal dp'.
In equilibrium, the growth rate of the nominal quantity of money supplied and the growth rate of
the nominal quantity of money demanded also are equal:

(3)

dm = dmd .

Combining (3) with (1) and recalling the discussion in connection with (2), we get:

9

(4)

dm = L (dy,di,u) + dp'.

The upshot here is that with dp' given, the nominal stock of money in the domestic economy is
proximately determined by the quantity of real cash balances demanded.
Monetary growth and inflation in the case of this assumed small domestic economy, therefore, are
jointly determined. For the reserve-currency country, in contrast, monetary growth is determined by
domestic policy considerations. Given the behavior of the real quantity of money demanded, it in turn
determines the rate of inflation both in the reserve-currency country and per the discussion above in the
domestic economy too.
Interest rates in this world of long-run equilibrium and fixed exchange rates are assumed to change
by the same absolute amount in the domestic economy and in the reserve-currency country. By definition,
exchange rates are fixed. If they are expected to remain so, then via uncovered interest-parity, the levels of
nominal interest rates in the two countries will be equal. Since actual and anticipated rates of inflation
within each country are equal by the assumptions of the model, real interest rates via the Fisher equation
will be equal.
In a floating exchange rate world, equations (1), (2), and (3) and the reserve-currency-country
analogues of (1) and (3) are combined into a three-equation system in which the rate of change of the
exchange rate is determined by the difference in the growth rates of the excess supplies of money (dm - L)
in the two countries and each country's inflation rate is determined by growth in its excess supply of
money alone.
We can write these equations as:

(5)

de = dm - L(dy,di,u) - dm' + L'(dy',di',u'),

(6)

dp = dm - L(dy,di,u),

(7)

dp' = dm' - L'(dy,di,u).
10

Again these are to be viewed as long-run equilibrium equations.
Unlike the fixed-rate case, there is no necessary connection between growth rates of the supply of
and the demand for money. Money supply growth in both countries is now determined by domestic
considerations. An increase in the growth rate of the demand for money with no change in the growth of
supply would result in a decrease in the rate of inflation. Variations in L will impinge on dm only if
policymakers choose to stabilize dp.
In further contrast to the situation under fixed exchange rates, nominal interest rates are free to
vary among countries. Here uncovered interest parity is consistent with differences in the levels of interest
rates equal to the percentage rate of increase of the exchange rate. This independence of nominal interest
rates does not correspond, of course, to a similar independence of real interest rates which may be even
more harmonized if capital controls imposed under fixed exchange rates have been removed, which as
Goldberg, et al. (2003) show, appears to be the case.
The implications of the model are, therefore, straightforward. In the long-run equilibrium world
that it describes, the growth in the excess supply of money should bear a one-to-one relationship to
inflation and no relationship to real income growth. Qualitatively, the same thing should be true for
relative inflation rates and hence by extension relative excess money growth vis-à-vis exchange-rate
growth: one-to-one relationships between both nominal variables and the rate of change in the nominal
exchange rate and no relationship between either and the rate of change of the real exchange rate.

III. Empirical Results: Cross-country Relationships
The data we use to test these propositions are for the same countries and period as the inflation
data. For all 20 countries, we have collected annual figures for the period 1957-1998 for high-powered
money ("reserve money" in IMF terminology), a broad definition of money, which we label M2 (generally
the sum of what the IMF terms "money" and what it terms "quasi-money"), a cost of living index, real and
nominal GDP, and U.S. dollar exchange rates. We stop in 1998 because of the introduction of the Euro in
11

1999 and resultant change in the Euro-area monetary data. The sources of most of these data again was
the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics, both the CDROM and print versions.8
For each of the variables of interest we computed average rates of growth for each country for each of the
three regimes separately. We then took the first differences of these averages and used the resultant
figures – the “growth shifts” – as our basic units of observation.
Before turning to this analysis, we present a general overview of the data on a regime-by-regime
basis. We present this evidence in Table 3 which lists cross-country averages and standard deviations of
the country-average growth rates and cross-country standard deviations of the key variables used in our
analysis as well as for four additional variables, the difference between M2 growth and real GDP growth, a
measure of the excess supply of M2, the difference between nominal exchange rate growth and the
inflation differential, the rate of growth of the real exchange rate, the rate of growth of the relative excess
supply of M2 and the relative rate of inflation. The latter are defined as the difference between the foreign
and U.S. variables in both instances.
As it turns out, these figures provide an important first bit of evidence on the performance of
theory. They are both fully consistent with the quantity-theory explanation of inflation behavior and,
except for certain aspects of exchange-rate behavior, with the closely-related classical neutrality
proposition. The average rates of growth of the monetary variables, and in particular excess M2, increase
and then decrease across the three periods. The same is true for the other nominal variables. Consistent
with the neutrality proposition, the average rates of growth of the two real variables, real GDP and the real
exchange rate, in contrast, follow entirely different patterns. In the main, the same things hold for the
cross-country standard deviations.
For the average growth rates of nominal exchange rates, there is a parallel with movements in the
relative average inflation rate and a lesser but still positive association with relative excess M2 growth.

8

In a considerable number of instances we encountered breaks in these data and in several cases missing
observations. Breaks were corrected by interpolation. Publications of the OECD provided most of the missing data.
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Even in the case of relative inflation, however, the changes in nominal exchange rate growth are
substantially greater, the result of which is a positive association between inflation and real-exchange-rate
growth. This departure from neutrality is mirrored in the behavior of the standard deviations. Nominal
and real exchange rates behavior is more variable across countries under both post-1973 inflation regimes
and although this variability in both instances has decreased somewhat during the third regime the
decreases are considerably less than the decreases in the cross-country variability of inflation. The match
is, however, somewhat closer with relative M2 growth.
We turn now to the growth shifts. Figures 3 and 4 contain graphs of these data. Tables 4 and 5
report the corresponding regression results. Plotted in three panels of Figure 3 are shifts in the average
rates of inflation, nominal GDP, and real GDP in the twenty countries against shifts in the rate of growth
of the nominal M2 money stock. Plotted in two panels of Figure 4 are shifts in the average rate of growth
of nominal U.S. dollar exchange rates against shifts in the rate of growth of relative consumer prices and
shifts in the rate of growth of relative excess supplies of money, again proxied by the difference in the
relative rates of growth of money and real GDP. The crosses in each instance indicate growth shifts from
period one to period two; the circles, growth shifts from period two to period three.
Taken as a group, the forty points in the consumer-price chart appear fairly evenly dispersed about
the forty-five-degree line through the origin. Over the broad range of experience, therefore, the
one-to-one relationship between inflation and money growth suggested by theory approximately holds.
For nominal GDP, we see very much the same thing. The only difference is the somewhat tighter
dispersion of the points about the forty-five-degree line for nominal GDP than for consumer prices.9 For
real GDP, the picture is markedly different. There clearly is no positive relationship between real GDP
and money, only what appears to be a rather weak negative relationship.
The regression results reported at the top of Table 4 are completely consistent with these visual

9

The likely reason for this closer fit, as we point out below, is the effect of shifts in real income on the
demand for money.
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impressions. The slope coefficients in both the nominal GDP and the consumer price regressions are
close in value to and insignificantly different from unity and the intercept in the nominal GDP regression is
close to and insignificantly different from zero. Both regressions, moreover, account for a high proportion
of the variance of the independent variable – 78 per cent in the case of nominal GDP versus money and 66
per cent in the case of consumer prices versus money. In the real GDP regression, in contrast, the
explanatory power of the growth shift in money is quite low and its estimated slope coefficient small in
absolute value, findings that again are consistent with theory. The coefficient is, however, negative and
significantly different from zero in apparent violation of theory. As it turns out, there is more to this story.
The other noticeable feature of the data plotted in Figure 3 is the difference in the relations
between the three key variables and money in the two shift episodes. For both nominal GDP and
consumer prices, most of the observations for the first growth shift are above the forty-five-degree line and
to the right; most of the observations for the second, in contrast, are below the line and to the left. For real
GDP, the bulk of the observations for the first shift appear to be scattered about a horizontal line
intersecting the vertical axis several percentage points below the origin while those for the second appear
to be scattered about a line intersecting the vertical axis a percentage point or so above the origin. In
neither episode, is there any clear association between the shift in real GDP growth and the shift in money
growth.
The remaining three regressions in Table 4 focus on these phenomena. In the first of these, we
regressed the growth shift in real GDP on the growth shift in nominal money and a dummy variable for the
second shift. This variable, DS2, took the value of 1 for the second shift and 0 otherwise. The algebraic
sum of its coefficient and the constant is, therefore, an estimator of the mean real GDP shift in the second
episode and the constant alone an estimator of the mean shift in the first episode. The coefficient of DS2
was highly significant while the R2 increased from .51 to .73. The growth shift in nominal money became
insignificant. The estimate of the mean shifts were -2.7 per cent and 0.3 per cent, for the first and second
episode, respectively.
14

The difference in real GDP behavior in these two episodes also explains some of the differences in
price behavior. We see this in the fifth regression reported in Table 4. In this regression, we replaced the
growth shift in the nominal money stock by the growth shift in the excess supply of money, proxied once
again as the difference between the growth shifts in nominal money and real GDP. Using this simple
measure of monetary ease and tightness resulted in a marked improvement in goodness of fit – an increase
in the R2 of roughly a third. The coefficient of the excess-supply of money variable, moreover, was close
to and insignificantly different from unity.
Real income effects, though important, appear to be only part of the explanation for the difference
in price behavior since a similar pattern is visible in the chart showing the relation between nominal GDP
and money, implicit in which is an allowance for a unit real income elasticity of money demand. To
investigate this phenomenon further we ran an additional regression in which we regressed the growth shift
in nominal GDP, )dY, on DS2 (and a constant).10

Since )dy / )dP - ()dM2 - )dy) this regression in

effect imposes both the constraint of a unit income elasticity of demand and the constraint of a one-to-one
effect of nominal money on prices. This regression is the last of those reported in Table 4. The coefficient
of DS2 in the regression was negative and significant; the constant, positive and significant. The resultant
estimates of the mean difference between )dP and ()dM2 - )dY) were 2.1 percentage points and -1.3
percentage points respectively.
In both instances, the pattern is of the sort to be expected from theory. A one-time increase in the
anticipated rate of inflation and hence in nominal interest rates would lead to a one-time shift in the level
of the real money balances demanded. During a period in which a series of such upward shifts in nominal
interest rates took place, we, therefore, might expect to see a series of shifts in the level of real money
balances demanded and hence a temporary but perhaps protracted effect on their rate of change . During

10

The reason we adopt this simple empirical expedient is because reliable interest rate data are available
only for a subset of countries for our full sample period. In any event, given the financial changes that occurred
over this period it is by no means clear that a single interest rate such as the treasury bill rate would be an adequate
measure of the opportunity cost of holding money were such data available for all of the countries.
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the this period, inflation would run systematically higher than the rate of nominal money growth. The
reverse would be true during periods in which the anticipated rate of inflation was continually declining.
This first set of conditions to a large extent appears to have been characteristic of the 1974-1983 period
and the second to the period thereafter.
Additionally there may be an effect of we called the “portmanteau variable”operating. The
financial innovations that began in the late 1970s and that continued thereafter, among other things,
resulted in a substantial increase both in the range of assets providing monetary services and in the services
provided by existing monetary assets. These developments might be expected to have reenforced the
effects of the declines in interest rates on the real quantity of money demanded in the third period. The
factors that gave rise to these innovations in the 1970s and early 1980s – in particular the existence of
deposit interest ceilings as in the United States – very likely reenforced the effects of the increases in
interest rates on the quantity of real money balances demanded in the second period.11
In the three regressions reported in Table 5, we examine exchange-rate behavior. In both, the
shift in nominal U.S. dollar exchange rate growth is the dependent variable; the differentials in inflation
shifts and in excess M2 growth alternate as the independent variables. The first two relations are plotted in
Figure 4. In the last of the regressions reported in Table 5, the shift in real exchange rate growth is the
dependent variable and the shift in the M2 growth differential is the independent variable. The coefficients
of both the inflation differential and the excess M2 growth differential are statistically significant, and in
the case of the excess M2 growth differential not statistically different from unity. Purchasing power
parity in growth rate form continues to work tolerably well as also does the monetary model of exchange
rates. Excess M2 growth, in contrast, has no effect on the real exchange rate.

11

The move to ATMs, as an example, has altered the service flow that money holders receive from
deposits. In principle, such improvements in the "quality" of those assets could lead either to decreases or increases
in the real quantities of deposits that are held in the same way that technical change in the production of
conventional goods can either decrease or increase the factors of production that are used to produce those goods.
For earlier discussions of these issues see Klein (1974) and Lothian (1976).
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V. Conclusions
The experience of the United States and other industrial countries during the past four and a half
decades with its two sea changes in inflation behavior and the accompanying differences in such behavior
among countries is a fertile ground for testing the key propositions of monetary theory. The move to
floating exchange rates provided governments with the degree of freedom to pursue divergent and in some
instances substantially more expansive monetary policies than under the pegged, but occasionally
changing, nominal exchange rates of Bretton Woods. The subsequent declines in inflation throughout the
industrialized world added to the richness of this experience.
We use panel data for 20 OECD countries over this period to test two key propositions of
monetary theory -- that inflation is a monetary phenomenon, traceable in the first instance to excess growth
in money supply and that the nominal exchange rate as the price of two monies moves directly with the
relative excess supplies of the two monies.
Using relatively simple techniques, we find strong support for both propositions. We explain both
the major temporal movements in inflation and nominal exchange rate growth and the bulk of the
differences in the time paths of both among countries. In the main, we also are unable to reject the
restrictions placed on the coefficients in these two relationships by the theory. In the process, we also find
support for another key tenet of classical monetary theory, the neutrality proposition.
What accounts for the difference between these findings, particularly the difference during the
episode of inflation decline, and those reported in much of the existing literature? The answer, we believe,
is errors in variables, in the broader senses in which both Estrella and Mishkin (1997) and Friedman and
Schwartz (1991) use the term, and the failure of much of the existing research to adjust for these errors.
Focusing on the major temporal movements in the data – the cross-regime shifts that are our basic units of
observation – is one way of dealing with the signal extraction problem and resultant downward bias in
coefficient estimates that such errors produce. Taking cross-country variation into account, as Coakely et
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al. (2002) point out and as we also do here, is another such method. Correspondingly, averaging the data,
which is the first step in our analysis, is a traditional approach to the e.i.v. problem.
The implications of this analysis are straightforward. Viewed in a long-run context, the quantity
theory model continues to perform tolerably well. The well-documented difficulties of the model in
explaining behavior in the short run fade as the time horizon as lengthened and the focus shifted to major
movements.
Left unanswered is the deeper question of what accounts for the monetary fluctuations underlying
the major movements in inflation in these countries. John Taylor (2002) in his overview of the period
considers the various alternatives and concludes that a large part of the initial problem was the intellectual
failings of the naive Phillips curve model.12 Correspondingly, he attributes the lowering of inflation to
changed procedures for conducting monetary policy that are "more rule-like or systematic" and to a
"diffusion of ideas and experience about monetary policy" that spurred and otherwise enabled
policymakers to implement less-inflationary monetary policy. To paraphrase Richard Weaver, "Ideas had
consequences." If Taylor's conjectures are in fact correct, the results reported here become all the more
important, serving as an additional reminder of the potential harm that can result from ignoring the longstanding implications of classical monetary theory.

12

A similar argument is made by Sargent. Boschen and Weise (2003) present evidence supporting this
interpretation. Ireland (1999), presents evidence supporting an alternative time-consistency explanation of policy.
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Table 1a
AR(1) for Cross-country average inflation rate
avg(dpt) = b1 + b2 D2 + b3 D3 + b4 avg(dpt-1 )
coefficient
b1
b2
b3
b4

1.262
1.536
-2.204
0.762

R2
SEE

0.865
1.191

F-statistic
Log likelihood ratio

std. error

t-statistic
0.482
0.795
0.727
0.093

Chow breakpoint test: 1974 1982
6.145
probability
21.760
probability

2.620
1.933
-3.032
8.152

probability
0.013
0.061
0.005
0.000

0.0008
0.0002

Note: avg(dpt) is the cross-country average of the 20 countries’ annual inflation rates for
1958 to 1998; D2 takes the value 1 for 1974 to 1998 and 0 otherwise; D3 takes the value
1 for 1982 to 1998 and 0 otherwise.
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Table 1b
AR(1) for Cross-country standard deviation of inflation
sdev(dpt) = b1 + b2 D2 + b3 D3 + b4 sdev(dpt-1 )
coefficient
b1
b2
b3
b4

1.095
1.952
-2.009
0.324

R2
SEE

0.891
0.473

F-statistic
Log likelihood ratio

std. error

t-statistic
0.215
0.297
0.300
0.097

Chow breakpoint test: 1974 1988
16.7698
probability
43.5659
probability

probability

5.095
6.561
-6.687
3.337

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.002

0.000
0.000

Note: sdev(dpt) is the cross-country standard deviation of the 20 countries’ annual
average inflation rates for 1958 to 1998; D2 takes the value 1 for 1974 to 1998 and 0
otherwise D3 takes the value 1 for 1988 to 1998 and 0 otherwise.
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Table 2
Estimated Break Points in Inflation Rates in “Floating Rate”
Period Minimum SE for dpt = b1 + b2 D2 + b3 D3 + b4 dpt-1

AUS
AUT
BE
CA
DE
FI
FR
GE
IR
IT
JA
NE
NZ
NO
PO
SP
SWE
SWI
UK
US

Start date for 3rd period
1991
1985
1984
1983
1983
1982
1985
1982
1984
1984
1977
1977
1988
1988
1985
1979
1992
1992
1981
1981
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SEE
1.925
1.195
1.383
1.313
1.657
2.378
1.376
1.108
2.205
2.048
2.443
1.415
2.284
1.956
2.841
2.362
1.937
1.570
2.396
1.416

Table 3. Means and standard deviations of cross-country data by periods
1958-73

1974-83 1984-98

Means
dP
dH
dM2
dM2-dy
dy
dE
dQ
relative dP
relative dM2-dy

4.23
8.00
10.76
5.85
4.98
-0.53
-1.97
1.33
2.51

10.30
9.51
12.23
10.09
2.14
4.01
1.67
2.34
2.89

3.71
5.01
7.35
4.73
2.61
-0.62
-1.06
.45
2.25

1.83
7.23
5.13
5.14
2.65
2.74
3.11
1.83
4.92

4.59
8.47
6.08
6.02
2.07
7.25
5.74
4.65
6.11

2.29
9.35
5.09
4.99
1.87
5.71
5.48
2.34
5.04

Standard Deviations
dP
dH
dM2
dM2-dy
dy
dE
dQ
relative dP
relative dM2-dy

Note: All data are in the form of average annual rates of growth. The
symbols dP, dH, dM2, dy, dE and dQ represent the growth rates of the
price level, high-powered money (IFS "reserve money"), M2 (IFS
"money" plus "quasi-money"), real GDP, the nominal US dollar exchange
rate and the real U.S. dollar exchange rate respectively; dM2-dy is a proxy
for the growth rate of the excess supply of money; relative dP and relative
dM2-dy are the differences between the respective foreign and U.S.
variables.
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Table 4. Results of cross-country regressions for nominal GDP, consumer prices and real GDP
Dependent variable

R2/SEE

Constant

)dM2

)dY

0.263
0.616

0.983
11.521
(-.200)

0.777
2.503

)dP

2.072
2.889

1.240
8.651
(1.673)

.663
4.204

)dy

-1.371
-6.221

-0.236
-6.245

0.506
-0.236

)dy

-2.742
-9.192

-0.028
-0.587

)dP

0.479
1.000

)dP-()dM2-dy)

2.097
3.697

)dM2-dy

DS2

3.019
8.462
1.107
13.518
(1.303)

0.730
1.039
0.828
3.006

-3.379
-4.212

.318
2.537

Note: The symbol ) represents a first difference operator; thus )dx is the change in the regimeaverage rate of growth of x – the growth shift in x. The symbol dY is the average rate of growth
of nominal GDP; all other variables are as defined for Table 3. Conventional t statistics are given
directly beneath the coefficient estimates; t statistic to test the hypothesis that the coefficient is
unity are given beneath the coefficient in parentheses.
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Table 5. Results of cross-country regressions for exchange rates
Dependent variable

Relative )(dM2-dy)

R2/SEE

Constant

Relative dP

)dE

0.631
1.110

1.356
8.405
(2.206)

)dE

0.088
2.448

.800
3.429
(-1.085)

0.156
5.181

) dQ

0.088
0.104

.114
0.687

0.013
3.670

0.662
3.467

Note: All of the underlying variables are as defined in Table 3. The symbol ) represents a first
difference operator; Relative )dP and Relative )(dM2-dy) are defined with the US as the
numeriare. Thus, for example, Relative )dP for country i, equals )dPi - )dPUS. Conventional t
statistics are given directly beneath the coefficient estimates; t statistic to test the hypothesis that
the coefficient is unity are given beneath the coefficient in parentheses.
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Figure 3. Growth shifts in Nominal GDP, Real GDP and
Consumer Prices vs. Growth Shifts in Money
Across 20 OECD Countries
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Figure 4. Growth Shifts in Nominal Exchange Rates vs.
Relative Prices and Relative Excess Money across
19 OECD Countries
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